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THE KIMIBERLEY PROCESS' LEGACY: How THE 2000
CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR CONFLICT-FREE DIAMoNDS
CAN HELP SOLVE CONTEMPORARY HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE COBALT & COLTAN
MINING INDUSTRIES
Claire Henleben
I. Introduction
One might speculate that a country rich in natural resources - such as oil,
timber, or minerals - would be well off and that its people would prosper given
the country's wealth. However, this is not the reality in many countries where
these riches abound; the "resource curse" has cast its shadow over regions which
otherwise should have profited from their natural resources.1 To blame for this
unexpected misfortune is often the same set of circumstances: civil war and gov-
ernment overthrow coupled with the exploitation of a vulnerable population.
2
This problem resurges repeatedly in countries which meet these circumstances
and where the population extracts a material of value from the earth.3 This com-
ment seeks to highlight past iterations of this phenomenon, analyze where and
how prior solutions have gone wrong or made headway, and finally, to apply
those solutions to current resource crises in need of an effective solution.
Although historical precedent details generations of the exploitation of natural
resource mining by those waging war in developing nations, the issue did not
gain international attention or outrage until the 1990s and the beginnings of civil
war in Sierra Leone and Angola.4 Sierra Leone, as a country affected by the so-
named resource curse, is rich in natural diamond stores beneath its soil, and yet is
not itself a wealthy nation. 5 Exploitation of these diamond reserves first material-
ized in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front ("RUF") launched its violent
campaign to overthrow the Sierra Leonean government. 6 The RUF, in need of
funding for its fast-growing regime, turned to the country's diamonds as a read-
I Ingrid J. Tamm, Dangerous Appetites: Human Rights Activism and Conflict Commodities, 26
HUM. RTS. Q. 687-704 (2004); Maarten Voors, Resource and Governance in Sierra Leone's Civil War,
53 J. OF DEV. STUD. 278, 280 (016).
2 Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, The Curse of Natural Resources, I ANN. REV. OF RESOURCE
ECON. 139, 140-143 (009).
3 Duncan Brack, The Growth and Control of International Environmental Crime, 112 ENV. HEALTH
PERSP. No. 2 A80-81 (2004).
4 Philippe Le Billon, Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars, 98
ANNALS OF THE Ass'N OF Am. GEOGRAPHERS 98:2, 345-72 (2008).
5 Sigismond A. Wilson, Sierra Leone's Illicit Diamonds: The Challenges and the Way Forward, 76
GEoJouRNAL 191-212 (2011).
6 Id.
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ily-available solution.7 RUF recruiters forcibly compelled able-bodied Sierra Le-
oneans to excavate the country's rivers and hillsides for diamonds and recruited
child soldiers to fight in the rebels' military forces.8 Unearthed diamonds were
then smuggled out of the country and sold for profit, which the RUF used to
finance its campaign to overthrow Sierra Leonean president Joseph Saidu
Momoh - the country's leader since 1985. 9
In an attempt to corral Sierra Leone's ever-growing conflict diamond exports
and mitigate the damage inflicted as a result of mass forced labor, the United
Nations drafted Resolutions 55 and 56, along with the ratification of the Kimber-
ley Process Certification Scheme ("Kimberley Process") in 2000. The Kimberley
Process was instrumental in controlling the RUF's exploitation of human labor as
well as the global diamond trade's problematic business practices which contrib-
uted to conflict diamonds' distribution.10 Consequently, the global diamond in-
dustry currently employs standards which have their roots in the United Nations'
Kimberley Process and have all but eliminated the practice of illegal conflict
diamond mining in Africa."' However, the Kimberley Process is not without its
faults.
Following the onset of civil war in 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo
("DRC") suffered many of the same resource curse symptoms as Sierra Leone in
the early 1990s. 12 Although its second civil war officially ended in 2003, the
associated abuse of the country's natural resources still continues to plague the
central African state. 13 However, in DRC's case, the substance in question is not
diamonds, but coltan and cobalt: two minerals essential to the manufacturing of
nearly every electronic and mechanical device worldwide, including televisions,
telephones, laptops, cars, and planes. 14 DRC sits upon soil containing 60% of the
world's coltan stores, which rebel groups continuously exploit in order to finance
their fight against the DRC government. 15 Currently, there are no long-term solu-
tions to this ongoing domestic conflict, and the coltan and cobalt industries re-
7 Id.; see also Maarten Voors, Resource and Governance in Sierra Leone's Civil War, 53 J. OF DEV.
STUD. 278, 280 (016).
8 Alfred B. Zack-Williams, Sierra Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 20 THIRD WORLD Q.
143, 145-150 (1999).; see also Sigismond A. Wilson, Sierra Leone's Illicit Diamonds: The Challenges
and the Way Forward, 76 GEOJOURNAL 191-212 (2011).
9 Sigismond A. Wilson, Sierra Leone 's Illicit Diamonds: The Challenges and the Way Forward, 76
GEOJOURNAL 191-212 (2011).
10 John Michael Durnovich, This Land is My Land: Mending the Kimberley Process and Promoting
Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa by Reinforcing Individual Property Rights, 39 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 885 (2014) [hereinafter Durnovich].
I Ild.
12 AMNESTY IN'L, Tins is WHAT WE DIE FOR: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUB-
LIC OF THE CONGO POWER THE GLOBAL TRADE IN COBALT, 14-54 (2016).
13 Zandi Shabalala, Cobalt to be Declared a Strategic Mineral in Congo, REUTERS, (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-mining-cobalt/cobalt-to-be-declared-a-strategic-mineral-in-
congo-idUSKCN1GQ2RX.
14 Id.
15 THE HAGUE CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, COLTAN, CONGO & CONFLICT: POLINARES CASE
STUDY, 43-44 (2013).
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main largely unregulated. 16 This comment proposes that the application of the
Kimberley Process - with amendments to fill in gaps where the Process has
failed to meet expectations - will help alleviate the DRC's burgeoning conflict
coltan and cobalt crises.
II. Background: The Kimberley Process
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme entered into force in 2003 as a
method for remedying the conflict-ridden diamond industry in Western Africa,
and to further regulate an industry which had been allowed to flourish for de-
cades without significant supervision. 17 But in order to fully comprehend why the
Kimberley Process was a necessary means to ending uncontrolled and egregious
human rights abuses, one must first understand why the diamond trade was first
able to grow into such a lucrative industry at all.
With the resurgence of civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Libe-
ria, rebel groups hoping to overthrow their respective domestic governments
needed capital with which to fund their revolutions. 18 One of the first solutions to
this problem proposed - and subsequently adopted by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly - was to impose sanctions upon those countries which were the
most notorious abusers of human rights so as to set an example for other violators
worldwide. 19 However, this solution proved not to be as successful at remedying
the problem as the United Nations had hoped.20 Instead of thwarting bad business
practices and unethical mining conditions, the sanctions instead placed the heavi-
est of burdens on ordinary people which the sanctions were intended to protect,
thus leaving the responsible government bodies and rebel regimes largely unaf-
fected.2 1 Furthermore, even aptly-named "smart sanctions" imposed by the
United Nations in response to initial sanctions' failure to corral the diamond in-
dustries in Angola and Sierra Leone were unsuccessful - largely due to lack of
full implementation.2 2 Therefore, because traditional measures which ordinarily
would have been effective in regulating a runaway human rights-violating indus-
try proved fruitless, the United Nations crafted a new program aimed at the dis-
mantling of the intensely problematic gemstone market: the Kimberley Process.
2 3
16 Nakirfai Tobor, The Democratic Republic of Congo Declared Cobalt and Coltan Strategic Min-
eral, iAFRIKAN, (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.iafiikan.com/2018/03/3l/the-democratic-republic-of-
congo-will-declare-cobalt-a-strategic-mineral/.
17 Holly Burkhalter, Between the Lines: A Diamond Agreement in the Rough, 135 FOR. POL. 72-73
(2003) [hereinafter Burkhalter].
18 Id.; see also THE HAGUE CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, COLTAN, CONGO & CONFLICT:
POLINARES CASE STUDY, 76-79 (2013).
19 Burkhalter, supra note 17.
20 Albena P. Petrova, The Implementation and Effectiveness of the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme in the United States, 40 INT'L LAW. 945-60 (2006) [hereinafter Petrova].
21 Virginia Haufler, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Govern-
ance and Conflict Prevention, 89 J. OF Bus. ErTHncs 403-16 (2010).
22 Id.
23 Id.; KIMBERELY PROCESS: ABOUT, https://www.kimberleyprocess.comr/en/about (last visited Jan. 3,
2019).
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Motivated by international outrage in response to global diamond mining prac-
tices, as well as war crimes committed by rebel regimes hoping to earn a profit
from their country's natural resources, the United Nations began negotiations and
international discussions on the creation of the Kimberley Process in 2000.24 Af-
ter three long years of deliberation, the Kimberley Process entered into force and
became a legally binding certification scheme for all member states of the United
Nations in 2003.25
In order to remedy ongoing human rights violations in connection with unethi-
cal diamond mining procedures in affected countries, the Kimberley Process im-
plemented measures aimed at decreasing the likelihood of conflict diamonds
making their way into global diamond distribution channels. 26 The first and most
significant of these measures was the introduction of Kimberley "certifications".
Under the Kimberley Process' certifications, rough diamonds (diamonds which
are unpolished and cut raw from the earth by excavators) were to be gathered into
bundles and packaged together into groups of other uncut diamonds and given a
certification that those enclosed diamonds were not borne of humanitarian viola-
tions, unethical diamond mining conditions, or slave labor.27 Enclosed with the
certification was tamper-resistant and forgery-proof documentation that the
stones in that particular parcel were all eligible for distribution and in compliance
with United Nations' standards for human rights and best business practices. 28
In addition to its certifications , the Kimberley Process launched additional
measures at the state and local levels of government in 40 participating nations.29
In those participating states, including Angola and Sierra Leone, the governments
of each were required to ensure that the diamonds bound for global distribution
were packaged in sealed containers, that they were properly certified, and that the
diamonds inside did not originate from countries not in compliance with the
Kimberley Process. 30 Furthermore, member states would be required to disclose
information concerning their individual diamond output, including diamond pro-
duction levels and specific hurdles or problems the state faced in implementing
Kimberley Process programs. 31 Finally, in addition to the Kimberley Process cer-
tificates and specific disclosure requirements, member states were required to
implement domestic legislation aimed at eliminating conflict diamond exports
24 Durnovich, supra note 10.
25 Burkhalter, supra note 17.; see also THE HAGUE CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, COLTAN,
CONGO & CONHICTr: POLINARES CASE STUDY, 76-79 (2013).
26 Durnovich, supra note 10.
27 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, CONFLICT DiAmONDS AND THE KLMBERELY PROCESS, https://www.state.gov/
conflict-diamonds-and-the-kimberley-process/ (2017); Burkhalter, supra note 17.
28 Burkhalter, supra note 17.
29 Id.
30 Joseph Hummel, Diamonds Are a Smiggler's Best Friend: Regulation, Economics, and Enforce-
ment in the Global Effort to Curb the Trade in Conflict Diamonds, 41 THE INT'L. LAW. 1145, 1145-1151
(2007).
31 Durnovich, supra note 10.
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with accompanying procedures for adjudication and prosecution of humanitarian
rights violators. 32
Ill. Effectiveness Of The Kimberley Process
The Kimberley Process has maintained a legacy - both positive and negative -
in the international community for its progress in eliminating conflict diamonds
from global distribution. 33 As a secondary mechanism for ensuring the program's
success, third party NGO's and non-diamond-distributing United Nations mem-
ber states were invited to submit their own independent findings concerning the
Process' progress. 34 These organizations and states, including Global Witness
and Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), serve as official observers to the Kimber-
ley Process.35 This third party encouragement strengthened the Kimberley Pro-
cess' peer review procedures and allowed for foreign, neutral observer states and
organizations to lend their expertise to Kimberley Process member states.
36
The Kimberley Process has in fact satisfied one of its main goals in that it has
succeeded at significantly decreasing conflict diamonds' role in funding rebel
regimes in West African particularly vulnerable countries. 37 Angola and Sierra
Leone in particular found their success through adherence to four central man-
dates imposed upon member states to the Kimberley Process.3 8 First, states must
enact domestic legislation which satisfies the import and export requirements and
working conditions standards specified in the Kimberley Process. 39 Second,
states must collaborate and share statistical data concerning the nations' diamond
exports, including data concerning the region of diamond excavation, accompa-
nied by a documented warranty that the stones are ethically sourced.4 0 Third,
states are bound only to engage in trade and diamond-related commerce with
other Kimberley Process-complying nations. 4 1 Finally, all stones bound for ex-
portation and international sale must have an accompanying Kimberley Process
32 Burkhalter, supra note 17; NIGEL DAVIDSON, THE LION THAT DIDN'T ROAR: CAN THE KImBERLEY
PROCESS SroP THE BLOOD DIAMONDS TRADE? 73-126 (2016).
33 Andrew H. Winetroub, A Diamond Scheme is Forever Lost: The Kimberley Process's Deteriorat-
ing Tripartite Structure and its Consequences for the Scheme's Survival, 20 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 1425, 1425-44 (2013) [hereinafter Winetroub].
34 Burkhalter, supra note 17.
35 Winetroub, supra note 33.
36 Id.
37 Winetroub, supra note 33.
38 Petrova, supra note 20.
39 Khaled Fayyad, The Kimberley Process and The Unfulfilled Promise of a Conflict-Free Diamond
Industry, SEMINAR ON CORP. AND INT'L LAW (May 7, 2018), https://sites.duke.edu/corporations/2018/05/
07/the-kimberley-process-and-the-unfulfilled-promise-of-a-conflict-free-diamond-industry/ [hereinafter
Fayyad].
40 Id.; see also Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, at Section II,
[hereinafter KPCS].
41 Id.
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certificate guaranteeing the stones' collective compliance with the Kimberley
Process regulations for ethically-sourced stones. 42
Sierra Leone and Angola responded well to these four goals and in turn, for-
ever changed the diamond industry. 43 According to the World Diamond Council,
since the inception of the Kimberley Process, merely a fraction of one percent of
all diamonds exported from Kimberley Process member states are "conflict
diamonds."44 This number has dramatically decreased since the 1990s in Angola
and Sierra Leone, in which an estimated 15% - 20% of diamonds originated from
mines employing slave and child labor.45 Sierra Leone in particular has managed
to maintain a steady stream of ethical diamond exports - the country imported
$126,652,633 in diamonds in 2004 and $122,101,392 in 2017.46 Moreover, the
percentage of diamonds sourced unethically has dropped to less than 1%, com-
pared to 14% in 1991. 4 7 As such, Sierra Leone has been able to continue the
distribution of its most valuable export without sacrificing its attention to human
rights .48
However, the Kimberley Process still left plenty room for improvement. The
first of the Process' flaws concerns the original document's definition of "con-
flict diamonds. ' 49 The Kimberley Process refers to conflict diamonds as, "rough
diamonds used by rebel movements... to finance conflict aimed at undermining
legitimate governments." o50 Unfortunately, this definition falls short of encom-
passing all possible unethically-sourced stones because (a) it is contingent upon
the existence of a government being actively overthrown or having attempts of
the same and (b) it refers only to stones sourced for the purpose of funding anti-
governmental regimes. 51
The consequences of this narrow definition are evident in the continued -
albeit much less significant - abuse of human rights in the diamond mining in-
dustry. All that a diamond distributor, wholesaler, or miner must do in order for
his or her diamonds to fall outside the definition of "conflict diamonds" - and to
thus not be bound by the Kimberley Process - is to refrain from using funds from
the diamonds' profit to finance rebel regimes.52 Of course, the assurance that
funds from diamond sales will not reach rebel hands is nearly impossible to guar-
42 Id.; see also KPCS, supra note 40, at Section II, Appendix I.
43 Nazreen Shaik-Peremanov, Ten Years On, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and
Zimbabwe's Marange and "Conflict Diamonds": Lessons to be Learnt, POTCHEFSTROOM EFC. L.J. 326,
326-66 (2014).
44 Fayyad, supra note 39.
45 Id.
46 Sierra Leone, KIMBERLEY PROCESS PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS, (Apr. 18, 2019), https://
www.kimberleyprocess.com/ee/sierra-leone-0.
47 Winetroub, supra note 33.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 KPCS, supra note 40, at Section I.
51 Barbara Harlow, The "Kimberley Process": Literary Gems, Civil Wars, and Historical Resources,
3 THE NEw CENTENNIAL Rv. 219, 220-24 (2003).
52 Winetroub, supra note 33, at 1432-34.
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antee, especially in countries where armed conflict (or even the potential of
armed conflict) currently threaten the state's sovereign government.
53
Additionally problematic is the fact that the Process's terms are limited only to
diamonds. 54 At the exclusion of all other gemstones, minerals, and resources that
might be - and have historically been - exploited by those wishing to profit from
the unethical sale of these materials, the Kimberley Process has defined its scope
far too narrowly.55 And although the Kimberley Process undoubtedly has an im-
pressive history of almost entirely eliminating unethical diamond mining prac-
tices, other conflict minerals have gone largely ignored by would-be watchdog
programs. 56
However, the Kimberley Process has perhaps an even larger problem specifi-
cally regarding the complicated network of hoops that collaborating states must
jump through in order to reach a consensus, which is especially problematic
when immediate action is critical. 57 For example, if a country in the Kimberley
Process network asserts that the most prudent course of action is to enact stricter
regulations concerning the certificates given to batches of stones, then that coun-
try would have to propose a vote of all Kimberley Process nations.5 8 The parties
must then reach a consensus before enacting any changes to the Kimberley Pro-
cess' existing framework, including proposals for changes to the certificates or
requests for enforcement against non-compliant parties.5 9 In practice, a consen-
sus is often difficult to reach, considering the large number of states involved
with the Process, and so countries' proposed improvements often fall to the way-
side with time.60
Yet another problem with the Kimberley Process' effectiveness lies in its weak
legal framework.61 Because the United Nations wanted to incentivize as many
states as possible to become signatories, the Kimberely Process was not self-
executing. This is because the Process' drafters hoped that this design would
allow member states to create legislation of their own, tailored to their country's
specific needs and circumstances. And although executing legislation is required
in order for signatories to officially join the Process, there are surprisingly few
guidelines which outline the actual content or strictness of member states' imple-
menting legislation. 62 Therefore, due to the United Nations precedential defer-
ence to state sovereignty, the Kimberley Process was designed in a way that
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1429.
55 Id. at 1432.
56 Petrova, supra note 20, at 947.
57 Winetroub, supra note 33, at 1432.
58 Id.; NIGEL DAVIDSON, THE LION THAT DIDN'T ROAR: CAN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS STOP THE
BLOOD DIAMONDS TRADE? 73-126 (2016).
59 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH STATEMENT ON THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS, https:/
/www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/06/human-rights-watch-statement-kimberley-process (June 6, 2016).
60 Id.; see also Fayyad, supra note 39.
61 Winetroub, supra note 33, at 1436.
62 KPCS, supra note 40, at Section IV.
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promotes states' ability to be as severe or lenient in their executing legislative
language as desired.63
Aside from these shortcomings, the Kimberley Process' perhaps most fatal
flaw concerns its focus on batches of diamonds as a whole instead of the treat-
ment of stones individually. 64 Because the Kimberley Process certificates apply
only to large batches of diamonds - sometimes in the hundreds or thousands
depending on stone size - non-ethically sourced stones often comprise at least a
small portion of otherwise certified stones. 65 Smugglers, wholesalers, and pro-
spective buyers intending to transport conflict diamonds across state borders can
easily work around Kimberley Process regulations by adding conflict stones to
previously-certified batches. 66 Furthermore, because individual diamonds have
no bar codes, tags, or documentation of their origin past the point of certification,
there is virtually no way of differentiating "blood diamonds" from a batch of
hundreds of otherwise Kimberley-compliant stones once they are bundled
together. 67
Looking to the culmination of problems with the Kimberley Process' efficacy,
it becomes apparent that the Process' multiple regulations and guidelines for
compliance focus too heavily on the end product - the diamonds - instead of the
root of the problem: the human rights abuses which sparked international outrage
in the first place. Therefore, if future iterations of the Kimberley Process hope to
be more successful in eliminating loopholes and providing for the most effective
means of compliance, the United Nations must shift its focus from the diamonds
themselves to the people or institutions inflicting harm.
IV. The Issues Of "Conflict Cobalt" & "Conflict Coltan"
The Democratic Republic of Congo is similar to Sierra Leone, Angola, and
other Kimberely Process member states in many ways; all have dealt with an
onslaught of rebel attempts to overthrow the states' sovereign governments, all
have not-so-spotless human rights records, but perhaps most strikingly, all have
an abundance of natural, valuable resources. 68 Whereas Sierra Leone, Angola,
and Zimbabwe are rich in diamonds, DRC's resource wealth lies in the soil's
natural cobalt and coltan stores. 69 Unfortunately, DRC has been unable to over-
come its own "resource curse" in a manner similar to its West African neighbors
in that the country is rife with human rights abusers - specifically due to runoff
63 Winetroub, supra note 33, at 1436.
64 KPCS, supra note 40.
65 Michael L. Ross, How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,
58 INT'L ORG. 35, 35-67 (2004).
66 Id.
67 Id.; see also Michael L. Ross, How do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from
Thirteen Cases, 58 INT'L ORG. 35-67 (2004).
68 MARIE MAZALTO, MINING IN AFRCA: REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 187-191, 187-242 (Bon-
nie Campbell, 2009).
69 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THIS IS WHAT WE DIE FOR: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE DEMO-
CRATIC RF.'PUBIC OF THE CONGO POWER THE GLOBAL TRADE IN COBALT, 14-18, 14 - 54 (Amnesty
International Publishing, 2016).
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tension from the Rwandan Genocide of 1994.70 Thus, a new generation of human
rights violators have taken advantage of their country's valuable stores of cobalt
and coltan and have utilized child labor to excavate both minerals from the
ground as a means of financing their regimes. 71
After the conclusion of the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, ethnic Hutus left
Rwanda in droves across their country's border into the DRC where they felt
DRC's president Mobutu Sese Seko would be sympathetic to their interests.
72
Once settled, DRC Hutu militia groups began their attack on ethnic DRC Tutsis.
However in response, the Tutsi militia was eventually able to forcibly overthrow
Mobutu's government and install its own president, Laurent Kabila, in 1997.
7 3
Despite the fact that formal fighting has since ceased, pockets of rebel groups
continue to skirmish in some of the most rural regions of DRC.7 4 However, after
President Kabila's assassination in 2001 and subsequent years of rising tensions,
DRC is still in a continual state of unrest, with periods of peacetime interrupted
periodically by eruptions of civil instability.
75
One of the most prominent rebel groups to emerge from rural DRC is M23, a
militia comprised of ethnic Tutsis with alleged ties to the Rwandan govern-
ment.76 Relying on the wealth gained from the sale of conflict minerals -
namely, cobalt and coltan - M23 leaders are able to obtain arms and fund their
operations from their outposts in the most rural and mountainous regions of
DRC; regions which happen to encompass the majority of DRC cobalt and coltan
mines. 77 Because cobalt and coltan are the primary minerals needed in the manu-
facture of lithium ion batteries (included in electronic cars, laptops, cellular tele-
phones, televisions, and virtually every method of renewable energy technology)
it should come as no surprise that M23 leaders have taken advantage of the fact
that the cobalt and coltan mining industries have reached a demand comparable
to that of diamond mining. 78
70 Lorna Nicholas, Cobalt Supply Chain Needs Transparency as Human Rights Violations Continue
in DRC, Small Caps, Oct. 2, 2018, https://smallcaps.com.au/cobalt-supply-chain-transparency-human-
rights-violations-drc/.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Peter Eichstaedt, Consuming the Congo: War and Conflict Minerals in the World's Deadliest
Place, 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 205-206 (2012).
74 Lorna Nicholas, Cobalt Supply Chain Needs Transparency as Human Rights Violations Continue
in DRC, Small Caps (2018).
75 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THIS IS WHAT WE DE FOR: HUMAN RIGHTrs ABUSES IN THE DEMO-
CRAnC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO POWER THE GLOBAI. TRADE IN COBALT 14-16 (2016).
76 Reuben E. Brigety, II, Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Council on Foreign
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, Oct. 19, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-
tracker# !/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo
77 Id.; see also
78 Zandi Shabalala, Coltan to be Declared a Strategic Mineral in Congo, Reuters, Mar. 14, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-mining-cobalt/cobalt-to-be-declared-a-strategic-mineral-in-
congo-idUSKCN1GQ2RX.; see also Dev Nathan & Sandip Sarkar, Blood on Your Mobile?, 45 EcON. &
POL. WKLY., 22, 24 (2010).
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Currently, 60% of the worlds' cobalt and coltan stores originate in DRC.79
However, despite the country's overwhelming resource wealth, DRC is the 176th
poorest country - with a poverty rate of 64%.80 DRC's harsh economic climate
has thus incentivized DRC citizens to leave urban areas and relocate to more
mountainous settlements to work in an industry that they recognize as potentially
profitable: cobalt and coltan mining.81 Unfortunately, human rights investigators
and third party non-profit organizations, such as Amnesty International, have in-
vestigated rural DRC mines and have found there to be an overwhelming utiliza-
tion of child labor.82 Amnesty International reports that parents will send their
children, sometimes as young as six years old, to work in the cobalt and coltan
mines in order to supplement the family income. 83 Often, workers do not have
the proper licensing or documentation identifying them as above the age of 18,
and because many cobalt and coltan mines operate in rural mountainous regions
of the DRC, the government employs very few regular investigations of the
country's mines. 84
For example, mining camps in the Kapata neighborhood of Kolwezi frequently
report fatal mining accidents and a high risk of miners' injury.85 These small
mining operations, referred to as "artisanal mines" employ both adults and chil-
dren as part of their workforce and often turn a blind eye to hazardous working
conditions in favor of quick mineral recovery and cost-efficiency. 86 However, the
cost of ignoring human rights in the workforce is extreme; high exposure levels
to raw cobalt can cause irreversible harm to miners' health, often causing de-
creased pulmonary function, asthma, and other related respiratory problems in
the mildest of cases. However, increased exposure also significantly increases
miners' chances of developing "hard metal lung disease", a condition which can
be fatal. 87 Despite global knowledge and universal medical recognition of the
dangers of cobalt and coltan mining, the DRC's own mining code - the only
legislation in place to regulate domestic cobalt and coltan mining working condi-
tions - does not contain any language pertaining to safety equipment or how to
handle known harmful substances, apart from mercury. 88
79 Overview, THE WORLD BANK IN DRC (2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/
overview.
80 Id.
81 Loma Nicholas, Cobalt Supply Chain Needs Transparency as Human Rights Violations Continue
in DRC, Small Caps (2018).
82 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THIS IS WHAT WE DIE FOR: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE DEMO-
CRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO POWER THE GLOBAL TRADE IN COBALT 28 (2016).
83 Id. at 28.
84 Id. at 29.
85 Id. at 26.
86 Peter Eichstaedt, Consuming the Congo: War and Conflict Minerals in the World's Deadliest
Place, 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 206 (2012).
87 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THis IS WHAT WE DIE FOR: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN TrHE DEMO-
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As party to the International Labor organization's ("ILO") Worst Forms of
Child Labor Convention (No. 182), DRC is required to implement necessary leg-
islation and employment regulations aimed at eliminating the utilization of child
labor within its borders. 89 The ILO Convention defines children as those under
the age of 18 and further delineates that the "worst forms" of child labor are
those work environments wherein children's health, safety, or morals are contin-
ually threatened.90 Unsurprisingly, DRC cobalt and coltan mines often directly
violate the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention; not only do children
face the well-documented safety and health hazards of such mines, but children
are often physically abused by mine security guards for failure or physical inabil-
ity to complete tasks.9 1
The reasons why children often do not report their abuse or lack of adequate
working consditions to DRC authorities are threefold: first, these children often
realize that they are working underage and fear punishment for admitting em-
ployment.92 Second, they fear that by not working in the mines, they will cause a
loss of income for their families. 9 3 Third, militia leaders control the operation of
many rural DRC cobalt and coltan mines, which therefore incentivizes miners'
submission for fear of violence. 94 Consequently, rampant human rights abuses in
the form of internationally-recognized wrongful child labor continue to this day
in the DRC.95
V. Application of The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to Drc
Cobalt and Coltan Industries
The Democratic Republic of Congo would benefit from the application of an
amended Kimberley Process into its cobalt and coltan mining industries. How-
ever, a revitalized version of the Kimberley Process would likely have to undergo
extensive remodeling in order for its provisions to succeed in curbing DRC
human rights abuses related to cobalt and coltan mining.
First, and most obviously, this comment recommends that the Kimberley Pro-
cess should amend its definition of minerals to which the Process shall apply.
Namely, the Kimberley Process should not be restricted to diamonds, but should
also include minerals that have been historically proven to accompany human
rights abuses (such as coltan and cobalt, but also gold and other gemstones -
perhaps even petroleum, which has been used by ISIS to fund its arms acquisi-
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90 Id.
91 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TIs is WHAT WE DIE FOR: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE DEMO-
CRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO POWER THE GLOBAL TRADE IN COBALT 29 (2016).
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tions and military activities).96 Expanding the family of substances which can
apply for Kimberley Process-borne protections would not only incentivize other
mineral industries to comply with the Process' regulations, but it would also
lessen the need to implement new international legislation, conventions, and reg-
ulations every time a new conflict mineral arises in need of management.
Second, The Kimberley Process should reformat its legal framework to
streamline the process of reaching a consensus between member states requiring
an immediate decision or new course of action for punishment of newly non-
complying nations. In order to remedy this quirk of the original Kimberley Pro-
cess, a new amendment should be made to eliminate the requirement that every
member state to the Process must reach a consensus before a decision is made.
Instead, this comment offers that clusters of similar nations form groups within
the Process itself so that countries that are most interested in the legal outcomes
of a particular crises or cause for humanitarian concern can quickly and effi-
ciently come to an agreement without the interference of distant (and potentially
indifferent) states' input. Of course, the Process would need a singular authority
with which to bind the entire Process together, and to this end, this comment
proposes that one member state to the Process serve as the foremost authoritative
leader for a term of four years, allowing other member states to look to this entity
for ultimate decision making and resolving of in-fighting or disagreement among
member states.
Third, considering the ease with which it is possible to smuggle conflict
diamonds into batches of otherwise ethically-sourced diamonds, this comment
proposes that the new Process should eliminate certificates attached to whole
loads of stones. Although this plan would no doubt involve more time and atten-
tion, Kimberley Process authorities should instead bestow certificates upon spe-
cific mines, not stones. This suggestion has its root in the fact that the original
certificate program enacted by the Kimberley Process in 2000 neglected to police
conflict diamonds straight from the source. 97 However, this new proposal would
ensure that before cobalt and coltan are even excavated from the earth, mine
owners and facilitators are in compliance with controlling international agree-
ments, such as the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (No. 182) and
relevant Kimberley Process regulations.
The particular challenge with the DRC is that many of its cobalt and coltan
mines operate high in the rural mountainside of the country. 98 However, the im-
plementation of mine-specific certifications may still be feasible even at such
high altitudes and precarious terrain considering the large amount of ground cov-
ered and the size of the workforce employed in the original Kimberley Process
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diamond batch certifications. 99 Additionally, the presence of international author-
ities at cobalt and coltan mines would likely reduce the rampant child labor and
worker abuse by M23 militia mine operators and deter others from engaging in
similarly abhorrent business practices. Thus, because coltan and cobalt, like
diamonds, obviously do not come with the ease of bar codes or any clear identi-
fying information imprinted on them, and because the presense of a third party
would likely decrease children's rights violations, extra care and attention given
to the mines from which they originate will help alleviate human rights abuses
and promote the health and safety of all workers.
VI. Conclusion
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was a novel and effective means
of corralling the ongoing diamond crises in Western Africa when it entered into
force in 2000.100 However, although it enjoyed multiple triumphs and ultimately
led to the dramatic decrease of conflict diamonds' distribution into the global
diamond market, the Process has numerous faults which prevent it from achiev-
ing complete success. 101 Since the age since "blood diamonds" and the Western
African human rights violations following multiple civil wars and internal ten-
sion, new conflicts have arisen which require immediate international attention.
Cobalt and Coltan from the Democratic Republic of Congo exhibit all the
hallmarks of an exploited natural resource in need of international intervention.
As such, the Kimberley Process should be revitalized and extended beyond its
scope to include cobalt and coltan mining.
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